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Numerous theories posit that affectively salient stimuli are privileged in their capacity to
capture attention and disrupt ongoing cognition. Two underlying assumptions in this the-
oretical position are that the potency of affective stimuli transcends task boundaries (i.e.,
emotional distracters do not have to belong to a current task-set to disrupt processing)
and that there is an asymmetry between emotional and cognitive processing (i.e., emo-
tional distracters disrupt cognitive processing, but not vice versa). These assumptions
have remained largely untested, as common experimental probes of emotion–cognition
interaction rarely manipulate task-relevance and only examine one side of the presumed
asymmetry of interference. To test these propositions directly, a face–word Stroop pro-
tocol was adapted to independently manipulate (a) the congruency between target and
distracter stimulus features, (b) the affective salience of distracter features, and (c) the
task-relevance of emotional compared to non-emotional target features. A three-way inter-
action revealed interdependent effects of distracter relevance, congruence, and affective
salience. Compared to task-irrelevant distracters, task-relevant congruent distracters facil-
itated performance and task-relevant incongruent distracters impaired performance, but
the latter effect depended on the nature of the target feature and task. Speciﬁcally,
task-irrelevant emotional distracters resulted in equivalent performance costs as task-
relevant non-emotional distracters, whereas task-irrelevant non-emotional distracters did
not produce performance costs comparable to those generated by task-relevant emotional
distracters. These results document asymmetric cross-task interference effects for affec-
tively salient stimuli, supporting the notion of affective prioritization in human information
processing.
Keywords: attention, affect, interference resolution, emotional conflict, executive function, conflict, cognitive
control, Stroop
INTRODUCTION
Executive control enables organisms to act in accordance with
internal goals, promoting the processing of information relevant
to current objectives while mitigating distraction from irrelevant
information. Several critical functions underlie this ability, includ-
ing top-down attentional biasing that enhances the processing
of goal- or task-relevant information relative to task-irrelevant
information (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller and Cohen,
2001). However, both physically salient (Yantis and Jonides, 1990)
and affectively salient stimuli are adept at capturing attention in
a bottom-up fashion, and may therefore disrupt ongoing goal-
oriented processing (LeDoux, 2000; Ohman and Mineka, 2001;
Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009).While the privileged access to pro-
cessing resources exhibited by affectively salient stimuli is essential
to rapid responding to stimuli that may convey a potential threat
or possible reward, if affective stimuli are too adept at disrupt-
ing ongoing mental functions, harmful consequences may result.
Indeed, many models of psychiatric disorders have disruptions in
the interaction between executive function and affective process-
ing at their core (Bishop, 2007; Banich et al., 2009), highlighting
the necessity of characterizing the interactive inﬂuence between
these two processes.
Theories positing that affectively salient items have privileged
access during information processing (LeDoux, 2000; Ohman and
Mineka, 2001; Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009) typically entail two
key implicit assumptions regarding the properties of emotional
stimuli. The ﬁrst is that affective stimuli have the capacity to tran-
scend task boundaries, disrupting ongoing processing regardless
of whether they are relevant to the current task-set of the organ-
ism or not. The second is an assumption of asymmetry, whereby
affective information interferes with non-affective task-sets more
potently than non-affective information interferes with affective
task-sets. Importantly, while these two presuppositions provide
the foundation for the hypothesized privileged access of affective
stimuli to attention, they are rarely ever tested, as common experi-
mental probes of emotion–cognition interaction generally do not
manipulate the task-relevance of affective stimuli or the potential
for non-affective distracters to interfere with affective processing.
The goal of the current experiment was to explicitly test these two
assumptions.
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The question of affective inﬂuences on cognitive processing has
prompted the development of experimental paradigms seeking to
examine affective modulation of executive function, particularly
its inﬂuence on attention as gaged in classic conﬂict processing
tasks, such as the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935; Macleod, 1991).
In the color–word Stroop task, color words (e.g.,“red”) are printed
in an ink color (e.g., the color red), and the participant identi-
ﬁes the color of the ink while ignoring the semantic meaning of
the word. Thus, the ink color is the target, whereas the semantic
meaning of the word is the distracter. Typically, performance is
both slower and more error prone when the distracter is seman-
tically incongruent with the target (e.g., the word “green” printed
in red ink), likely due to the fact that these two features are both
semantically conﬂicting and prime mutually exclusive responses
(Kornblum et al., 1990; Macleod, 1991). A well-known adapta-
tion of the traditional Stroop paradigm to the affective domain
includes non-affective (e.g., “car”) and affectively salient (e.g.,
“death”) words as irrelevant stimulus features, and the potency
of emotional distracters is gaged by comparing response times
(RTs) between neutral and affective distracter conditions (Math-
ews and Macleod, 1985; McKenna, 1986; Whalen et al., 1998;
Isenberg et al., 1999; Compton et al., 2003). However, this adap-
tation suffers from several conceptual and practical limitations.
First, it does not really constitute an affective equivalent of the
classic Stroop task, as the inclusion of affectively salient stimuli
in the distracting feature dimension may capture attention but it
does not produce semantic or response conﬂict with the target fea-
ture (Algom et al., 2004). For instance, the semantic meaning of
a negative affective word is not directly incongruent with the ink
color in the same way that the semantic meaning of a color–word
would be, nor do affective words prime competing responses in
this case. Second, although this adaption could in principle gauge
the capacity of task-irrelevant affective stimuli to interfere with an
ongoing non-affective task-set (color-naming), it does not probe
whether this type of interference is asymmetrical. Finally, if this
protocol tests the capacity of affective stimuli to interfere with a
non-affective task-set, results obtained with this task should actu-
ally raise doubts as to whether affective information is in fact
capable of transcending task boundaries, as behavioral ﬁndings of
an “emotional Stroop effect” have been highly inconsistent, espe-
cially in healthy subject populations (McKenna, 1986; Williams
et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998; Isenberg et al., 1999; Compton
et al., 2003).
An alternative approach has been to design tasks where an
affective distracter could conﬂict directly with the target of the
ongoing task-set, by combining affective distracters with affective
targets and task-sets.One approach is amodiﬁed face–wordStroop
task, in which participants must make a judgment about a visu-
ally presented face image while ignoring an overlaid word label.
In affective versions of this task, the faces are modeling affective
expressions and the participant must categorize the expression
(e.g., happy or fearful) while ignoring an affective word label
(e.g., “happy,”“fear”; Etkin et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008). There-
fore, the distracter and the target are semantically related, and
incongruent distracters would likely generate both stimulus and
response conﬂict. Investigations using this type of paradigm reli-
ably report signiﬁcant behavioral slowing on incongruent trials
(Etkin et al., 2006; Haas et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; Ochsner
et al., 2009), indicative of a robust effect of emotional conﬂict.
However, this type of protocol does not examine the interac-
tion between affective salience and task-set relevance, leaving the
assumption that affective stimuli asymmetrically interfere with
non-affective task-sets unexamined. Thus, although tasks employ-
ing affective targets, distracters, and task-sets have expanded our
knowledge about emotional conﬂict processing, they preclude the
investigation of interactions between task-sets, target features, and
affective salience.
In sum, previous paradigms for investigating the impact of
affective distracters on non-affective task-sets have produced
inconsistent results regarding the capacity of affective distracters to
transcend task-set boundaries, whereas tasks employing affective
task-sets have only shown a reliable capacity of affective distracters
to disrupt performance during an affective task-set. Neither type
of protocol has tested whether interference effects across task-sets
are asymmetrical in nature, with affective stimuli having a more
potent effect than non-affective information. The extent to which
affective stimuli are prioritized in human information processing
therefore remains unclear.
The current study sought to examine the effects of distracter
task-set relevance and affective salience on behavioral perfor-
mance. A variant of the face–word Stroop task was adapted to
independently manipulate distracter congruence with the target
stimulus as well as membership in the current task-set, which
could involve either an affective or a non-affective judgment of the
target. This manipulation enabled the examination of the relative
capacity of both affective and non-affective stimuli to transcend
task boundaries in altering performance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight healthy college students (Mean Age 19.0 years, SD
1.0; 27 women) participated in this study for course credit. All
participants were ﬂuent in English and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Participants were screened via self-report to
exclude those with previous or current psychiatric or neurologic
conditions. All participants gave informed consent and this study
was approved for use in human subjects in accordance with the
Duke University Medical Center Institutional Review Board.
MATERIALS
Stimuli consisted of black and white face images from the Nim-
Stim Set of Facial Expressions1 (Tottenham et al., 2009) overlaid
with word labels. The stimulus set consisted of four female and
four male individuals posing both fearful and happy expressions,
resulting in a total of 16 distinct face stimuli. Images were cropped
to an oval that consisted of the main facial features to standardize
image size and shape across the different identities and expres-
sions. Additionally, image cropping removed non-face informa-
tion, such as hair, which could facilitate performance during
1Development of the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set was overseen by Nim Tottenham
and supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Early Experience and Brain Development. Please contact Nim Tot-
tenham at tott0006@tc.umn.edu for more information concerning the stimulus
set.
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gender discrimination. There were eight different versions of each
of the 16 distinct face stimuli, as each face was paired with gender
(“male,” “female”) and expression (“fear,” “happy”) word labels
that were superimposed on the center of the face images (in Hel-
vetica font and red ink), and which could be displayed in lower or
upper case lettering. Thus, the complete stimulus set consisted of
128 unique face–word compound stimuli. Four example stimuli
are displayed in Figure 1. The face images subtended approxi-
mately 12.4˚ of visual angle vertically and 7.2˚ horizontally. The
labels subtended approximately 1.4˚ of visual angle vertically and
3.8˚–8.1˚ horizontally. Stimulus presentation and data collection
were performed using Psychophysics ToolboxVersion 3 (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997) on Dell Optiplex 960 computers with Dell 19′′
LCD monitors. A chin rest was use to ensure that participants
maintained a distance of approximately 60 cm from the monitor
throughout the experiment.
PROCEDURE
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly
assigned to either a gender task or an emotion expression task in
a face–word Stroop paradigm adapted from previous work (Etkin
et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008). On each trial, participants were
presented with a compound face–word stimulus and instructed
to make a judgment of the face image as quickly and accurately
as possible while ignoring the word label. Participants assigned to
the gender task made a gender judgment (male or female) while
those assigned to the emotion expression task made an expression
judgment (fearful or happy). Responses were made via keyboard
presses using the index andmiddle ﬁngers of the right hand. Stim-
uli were presented for 1 s and followed by a variable inter-trial
ﬁxation interval of 2, 3, or 4 s drawn from a uniform distribution.
Following a brief practice, participants completed three runs of
145 trials each, with the ﬁrst trial in each run serving as a ﬁller to
mitigate any preparatory effects.
FIGURE 1 | Examples of experimental stimuli for (A) the emotion
expression task and (B) the gender task.The experiment varied distracter
congruency and relevance by manipulating the labels superimposed on the
face stimuli. The labels were printed in red ink in the experiment, but have
been presented in white ink here for display purposes.
Similar to previous versions of this task (Etkin et al., 2006;
Egner et al., 2008), the labels presented superimposed on the
images could be either semantically congruent or incongruent
with the target face image. For instance, a fearful male face could
be accompanied by a congruent “male” (or “fear”) label or by an
incongruent “female” (or “happy”) label. In a departure from ear-
lier versions, however, the labels were drawn not only from the
semantic category that was relevant to the current task-set (e.g.,
gender labels presented during the gender task) but also from the
category that was irrelevant to the current task-set (e.g., emotion
labels presented during the gender task; Figure 1). We refer to
the former as “task-relevant distracters” and to the latter as “task-
irrelevant distracters.” Importantly, task-relevant distracters could
be associated with both (semantic) stimulus conﬂict and response
conﬂict, because their semantic meaning could clash with the face
gender/emotion (potentially inducing stimulus conﬂict), and in
addition their meaning corresponded to a valid response option
in the task-set (potentially eliciting response conﬂict). By contrast,
task-irrelevant distracters could not generate response conﬂict,
as they had no correspondence with valid response options in
the task-set. Task-irrelevant distracters, however, could be associ-
ated with (task-irrelevant) semantic or stimulus conﬂict, and one
of the main goals of this study was to determine whether task-
irrelevant stimulus congruency could in fact affect responses to
task-relevant stimulus features, and whether this type of effect
would be dependent on the affective nature of the distracters. It
should be emphasized that the potential semantic or stimulus con-
ﬂict elicited in the current experiment would be due to completely
task-irrelevant distracters and is thus different from task-relevant
stimulus conﬂict that can be evoked, for example, by including
response-ineligible colors in a regular color-naming Stroop task
(Milham et al., 2001), or by employing many-to-few stimulus–
response mappings in ﬂanker or Stroop paradigms (De Houwer,
2003).
Each experimental run was balanced to include equal numbers
of trials in each of the four congruence and relevance conditions
(i.e., congruent–relevant, congruent–irrelevant, incongruent–
relevant, incongruent–irrelevant). Face stimuli in each condition
were equally likely to bemale or female, fearful or happy.Addition-
ally, the trial order was pseudo-randomized to ensure that there
were an equal number of trial transitions between each of the four
main conditions. Factors that could impact experimental effects
of distracter congruence and relevance, such as repetition priming
(Mayr et al., 2003) or cross-trial feature binding effects (Hom-
mel, 1998), were controlled by preventing any repetitions of the
same face identity on consecutive trials and alternating each trial
between uppercase and lowercase distracter word labels. Thus, no
exact perceptual features of either the target or the distracter ever
repeated across successive trials.
ANALYSIS
Analyses of categorization accuracy and RT were conducted using
SPSS (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). RT data exclude error tri-
als and post-error trials. Outlier RT values that were below
or above 2 SDs from the participant’s grand mean were also
removed, resulting in the exclusion of 4.8% of trials on aver-
age (SD 0.9%). Two participants whose RTs were more than
www.frontiersin.org September 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 232 | 3
Reeck and Egner Asymmetric interference by emotional distracters
2 SDs higher than the sample average in all four RT condi-
tions were excluded from subsequent analyses. The ﬁnal sample
sizes were therefore 19 participants (13 female) completing the
emotion expression task and 17 participants (12 female) com-
pleting the gender task. Response accuracy and RT data were
submitted to separate 2× 2× 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs with
distracter congruence (congruent versus incongruent) and task-
relevance (relevant or irrelevant) as within-subjects factors and
task (gender or emotion expression) as a between-subjects fac-
tor. Signiﬁcant results in the main ANOVAs were examined using
t -tests and ANOVAs. Means and SDs for participant RT and
accuracy are reported for each condition in Tables 1 and 2
respectively.
RESULTS
RESPONSE TIME DATA
Analyses of RT data revealed a main effect of distracter congru-
ence [F(1,34)= 24.4, p< 0.001], with slower responses to incon-
gruent than congruent stimuli. There were no signiﬁcant main
effects of either distracter relevance or task (p’s> 0.8). How-
ever, distracter relevance interacted with distracter congruence
[F(1,34)= 26.1, p< 0.001], as the congruency effect was signif-
icant only for relevant labels [t (35)= 6.9, p< 0.001] but not irrel-
evant labels (p> 0.8). Importantly, there was a three-way inter-
action between distracter congruence, distracter relevance, and
task [F(1,34)= 5.6, p = 0.024, Figure 2]. To explore the three-way
interaction, 2× 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted
with distracter relevance as a within-subjects factor and task as
a between-subjects factor separately for congruent and incongru-
ent trials. On congruent trials, the main effect of relevance was
signiﬁcant [F(1,34)= 19.0, p< 0.001], with relevant labels result-
ing in faster responses than irrelevant labels. Thus, for both tasks,
Table 1 | Means and SDs of participant response times (ms).
Emotion expression task Gender task
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
RELEVANT LABELS
Congruent 671 (75) 683 (82)
Incongruent 705 (76) 702 (78)
IRRELEVANT LABELS
Congruent 689 (70) 692 (76)
Incongruent 684 (84) 696 (84)
Table 2 | Means and SDs of participant accuracy.
Emotion expression task Gender task
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
RELEVANT LABELS
Congruent 94.44% (6.42) 92.48% (5.52)
Incongruent 88.55% (10.63) 92.16% (5.56)
IRRELEVANT LABELS
Congruent 91.67% (7.04) 90.47% (7.18)
Incongruent 93.03% (6.52) 91.50% (6.34)
congruent distracters facilitated performance to a greater extent
when the distracter was relevant to the current task-set. Neither
the main effect of task nor the interaction between distracter rel-
evance and task was signiﬁcant (p’s> 0.1). On incongruent trials,
the main effect of relevance was also signiﬁcant [F(1,34)= 13.0,
p = 0.001], as relevant labels resulted in slower responses than
irrelevant labels. Critically, the interaction between distracter rel-
evance and task was signiﬁcant [F(1,34)= 4.4, p = 0.043]. Partic-
ipants completing the emotion expression task exhibited slower
RTs on incongruent trials with task-set relevant labels (i.e., affec-
tive labels) than those with task-set irrelevant labels (i.e., gender
labels) [t (18)= 3.5, p = 0.002]. However, participants completing
the gender task exhibited equally slow RTs on incongruent trials
with task-set relevant and irrelevant labels (p> 0.15), indicating
that the incongruent affective labels interfered with their perfor-
mance despite their irrelevance to the task-set. Furthermore, RTs
did not differ across the congruent and incongruent–irrelevant tri-
als (p> 0.4), indicating that affective labels in general interfered
with task performance, regardless of congruency. Thus, whereas
gender labels did not affect performance during the emotion
expression task, affective labels produced marked impairments of
performance during the gender task, consistent with the capac-
ity of affective stimuli to capture attention irrespective of their
relevance to an ongoing task-set.
ACCURACY
Analyses of response accuracy revealed no signiﬁcant main effects
of distracter relevance, distracter congruence, or task (p’s> 0.05).
There were signiﬁcant interactions between distracter relevance
and task [F(1,34)= 4.2, p = 0.049], distracter congruence and
task [F(1,34)= 7.0, p = 0.012], and distracter relevance and con-
gruence [F(1,34)= 13.2, p = 0.001]. However, these interactions
were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant three-way interaction of dis-
tracter relevance, distracter congruence, and task [F(1,34)= 6.2,
p = 0.018, Figure 3]. To investigate this three-way interaction,
2× 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted with distracter
relevance as a within-subjects factor and task as a between-
subjects factor separately for congruent and incongruent trials.
On congruent trials, the main effect of relevance was signiﬁcant
[F(1,34)= 14.0,p = 0.001],withhigher accuracy on relevant com-
pared to irrelevant congruent trials. Relevant congruent distracters
FIGURE 2 | Mean response times by distracter relevance and
congruence presented separately for (A) the emotion expression task
and (B) the gender task. Error bars represent SE of the mean.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean judgment accuracy by distracter relevance and
congruence presented separately for (A) the emotion expression task
and (B) the gender task. Error bars represent SE of the mean.
facilitated performance relative to irrelevant congruent distracters
on both tasks. There was no main effect of task nor was there
a signiﬁcant interaction between distracter relevance and task
(p’s> 0.5). On incongruent trials, there was a main effect of rele-
vance [F(1,34)= 4.2, p = 0.047], with lower accuracy in response
to relevant than irrelevant incongruent distracters. Importantly,
there was an interaction between distracter relevance and task
[F(1,34)= 7.6, p = 0.009]. Paired t -tests comparing accuracy on
irrelevant and relevant incongruent trials showed a signiﬁcant dif-
ference for participants performing the emotion expression task
[t (18)= 2.9, p = 0.009], such that accuracy was lower on rele-
vant compared to irrelevant incongruent trials. No such difference
was found for participants performing the gender task (p> 0.5).
Accuracy on irrelevant congruent and incongruent stimuli did
not differ (p> 0.2), indicating that affective labels interfered with
performance, irrespective of their congruency, and despite being
irrelevant to the current task-set. Consistent with the results from
analyses of RT, these ﬁndings indicate that the irrelevant emo-
tion labels in the gender task asymmetrically disrupt task perfor-
mance compared to the irrelevant gender labels in the emotion
expression task.
EFFECTS OF TARGET VALENCE
The observed interaction between task-set, distracter relevance,
and affective salience could additionally be modulated by the
affective content of the target stimulus. Although all the target
face stimuli modeled an affective expression (either happiness or
fear) and were counterbalanced across the cells of the factorial
design, the speciﬁc affective valence of the target stimuli could
nevertheless interact with observed effects of distracter relevance
and affective salience. To interrogate this possibility, additional
analyses were conducted in which trials were classiﬁed based on
target valence (happy or fear expression) as well as distracter rel-
evance and congruence. These analyses revealed no interactions
between target valence and the distracter relevance by congruence
by task-set interaction described above for either RT or accuracy
(p’s> 0.25). The present ﬁndings, therefore, appear to be driven
by the affective nature of the distracters and their relevance to the
current task-set as opposed to differences in affective valence of
the targets in this task. The absence of an effect of target valence
is consistent with the ﬁndings from a number of previous studies
of emotion–cognition interactions (Compton et al., 2003; Etkin
et al., 2006; Haas et al., 2006; Egner et al., 2008; Ochsner et al.,
2009).
DISCUSSION
The present study adapted a face–word Stroop paradigm to inves-
tigate two underlying assumptions of theories postulating pri-
oritized processing of affective stimuli: that affective stimuli can
disrupt processing across task boundaries and that this capacity
is not shared by non-affective stimuli. Analyses of the interac-
tion between distracter congruence, distracter affective salience,
and task-set relevance revealed that each of these factors modu-
lates task performance.While the basic pattern of responses in the
two task-sets was quite similar, the analyses revealed some signif-
icant distinctions: for both affective and non-affective task-sets,
incongruent distracters relevant to the current task-set resulted
in slower RTs and lower judgment accuracy compared to congru-
ent distracters, due to the generation of semantic and response
conﬂict. However, the inﬂuence of distracters outside the task-set
on performance was driven by an interaction between affective
salience and task-set. In the presence of a non-affective task-set,
gender categorization, affective labels markedly slowed RTs and
reduced judgment accuracy despite their irrelevance to the present
task-set, demonstrating the capacity of affectively salient stimuli to
disrupt ongoing processing and transcend task boundaries. This
effect was speciﬁc to the task-irrelevant affective distracters, as
non-affective, task-irrelevant distracters did not similarly impair
performance in the presence of an affective task-set, the emo-
tion expression categorization. Furthermore, this effect was not
dependent on the congruency of the affective word distracter with
respect to the equally task-irrelevant affective facial expression,
indicating that task-irrelevant affective salience interfered with
task performance regardless of congruency. In sum, affectively
salient distracter stimuli, but not non-emotional distracter stimuli,
interfered with ongoing performance despite their irrelevance to
current task-set, indicating that affective stimuli have the capac-
ity to transcend task boundaries and disrupt ongoing executive
processes.
The present ﬁndings extend those from previous investigations
of the interaction between affective processing and executive func-
tion. Previous adaptations of the Stroop paradigm utilizing task-
irrelevant affective distracters and non-affective task-sets (such as
adaptations of the color–word Stroop) examinedwhether affective
stimuli could disrupt ongoing non-affective top-down processing
but have met with mixed results (Mathews and Macleod, 1985;
McKenna, 1986; Whalen et al., 1998; Isenberg et al., 1999; Comp-
ton et al., 2003). Other adaptations utilizing task-relevant affective
distracters in the presences of affective task-sets exhibited robust
interference effects but did not speak to the capacity of affec-
tive stimuli to disrupt non-affective processing (Etkin et al., 2006;
Egner et al., 2008; Ochsner et al., 2009). Finally, neither of the sets
of studies above addressed the question as to whether affective
distracters have a greater potency for cross-task interference than
non-affective distracters. By contrast, the present study manipu-
lated the affective nature and task-relevance of target anddistracter
features independently, and demonstrated the asymmetry of these
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interference effects. Affective stimuli appear to disrupt ongoing
processing regardless of the task-set, while non-affective stim-
uli seem to impair performance only in the presence of relevant
task-sets and response contingencies.
The capacity of affectively salient stimuli to override top-down
biasing may be adaptive under certain circumstances. Affective
stimuli may help direct attention to, and thus improve the detec-
tion of, stimuli that convey biologically relevant information, such
as threat (Ohman and Mineka, 2001; Vuilleumier and Huang,
2009; Notebaert et al., 2011) or reward (Maunsell, 2004; Field
et al., 2009; Krajbich et al., 2010). The prioritized processing of
affective stimuli may also improve the speed and sensitivity of
processing of related information (Anderson and Phelps, 2001;
Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Phelps et al., 2006; Pourtois et al., 2006;
Lim et al., 2009), therein enabling rapid, appropriate responding
to salient information. Moreover, affectively salient stimuli can
help mitigate the inﬂuence of factors that might otherwise impair
executive function, such as by eliminating Stroop dilution effects
(Chajut et al., 2010) and overcoming the attentional blink (Ander-
son and Phelps, 2001; Lim et al., 2009). Thus, the ability of affective
stimuli to alter top-down processing can help promote adaptive
responding.
The interaction between affective processing and executive
function may, however, be disrupted in certain clinical disorders
(Bishop, 2007; Banich et al., 2009). Heightened levels of anxi-
ety, for instance, may result in hyper-vigilance for threat, and
afﬂicted individuals may have difﬁculty disengaging from affec-
tive stimuli which disrupt ongoing top-down processing (Fox
et al., 2001; Koster et al., 2004; Salemink et al., 2007), dimin-
ishing their ability to respond adaptively to subsequent stimuli
and function normally. In the present study, all participants were
screened for psychological and neurological disorders and sub-
clinical variability in anxiety and depression were not assessed;
however, the present ﬁndings anticipate that high-anxious indi-
viduals are likely to display greater cross-task interference from
affective distracters than low-anxious individuals. Future stud-
ies should investigate the interactions between affective process-
ing and executive function in relation to individual differences
and clinical populations, ideally in conjunction with neuroimag-
ing techniques, to elucidate the mechanisms underlying clinical
disorders.
The present study documented the capacity of affectively salient
distracters to interfere with ongoing processing despite irrelevance
to the current task-set. This interference could be produced
by rapid attentional orienting to the affective distracters, difﬁ-
culty disengaging attention from the affective distracters, or some
combination of both orienting and disengagement processes.
Clarifying the differential roles of orienting and disengagement
processes in selective attention has proved critical to elucidating
the processes underlying selective attention to threat, particu-
larly amongst anxious individuals (Fox et al., 2001; Koster et al.,
2004; Salemink et al., 2007). However, in the present paradigm,
the inﬂuences of these two processes cannot be distinguished.
Future research should endeavor to characterize the unique con-
tributions of orienting and disengagement to the type of affective
interference documented in the current experiment. The present
ﬁndings also indicate that the capacity of distracters to tran-
scend task boundaries in generating interference is restricted to
affectively salient distracters and not shared by non-affective dis-
tracters. Note though that non-affective distractersmay be capable
of crossing task-set boundaries in generating interferencewhen the
relevant task is non-affective in nature. The affective nature of a
task-set may help buffer it from task-irrelevant interference gener-
ally, producing the lack of observed interference by non-affective
task-irrelevant distracters. Either increased cross-task interference
produced by affective distracters or enhanced task-set shielding
for affective task-sets would support the asymmetrical effects of
interference reported here.
In conclusion, through the adaptation of a face–word Stroop
paradigm, the present study tested two key assumptions of theo-
ries of prioritized processing of affective stimuli, namely, that such
stimuli can transcend task-set boundaries and that this capac-
ity is not shared by non-affective stimuli. The current ﬁndings
support both of these assumptions, demonstrating that affective
stimuli disrupt top-down processing regardless of task-set, but
that non-affective stimuli only produce interference if relevant for
the task-set at hand. This asymmetric modulation of executive
function conﬁrms the prioritized processing of affective stimuli
and highlights the importance of understanding the interactive
inﬂuence of affect and cognition.
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